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In recent years combining multiple financial products into one package in a process 
known as bundling has become more common among microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
While bundling can be beneficial to MFIs by cutting costs and providing protection from 
client default, the implications for MFI customers are less clear. Bundling the products 
may take advantage of the existing relationship between the financial institution and the 
client to expand microinsurance access and take-up, but alternatively offering too many 
products could lead to low client understanding and thus low take-up of the product. 
We conducted a randomized field experiment to determine if separating the offer of crop 
insurance from the loan application would result in increased rates of take-up, coverage 
amounts and understanding amongst potential clients in Colombia. Individuals in the 
control group received a voluntary, bundled credit/insurance offer at the time they were 
applying for a loan, while individuals in the treatment group received a separated offer 
for the same insurance product several weeks after the loan application process was 
complete. Separating the insurance offer did not have a statistically significant effect on 
take-up rates, coverage amounts or product understanding. These findings suggest that 
the voluntary bundling of microfinance products is a valid approach to expanding 
vi 
 
outreach and increasing financial access that benefits both providers and clients. 
Measures of product understanding are low, however, in both the bundled and separate 







CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk management is critical to the livelihood of many households in developing 
countries, who face large and varied risks. Yet poor households are often inadequately 
protected against these risks, despite the myriad of informal and formal tools and 
strategies that they rely on (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, & Ruthven, 2009). Formal 
insurance products can contribute to improving poor families’ risk management 
outcomes, particularly microinsurance products, specifically designed for and targeted to 
poor individuals in developing countries through low premiums, low coverage amounts, 
and simplified terms. Emerging microinsurance products include life insurance, credit-
life insurance, health insurance, as well as rainfall insurance and other broader types of 
crop coverage. While the widespread availability of microinsurance products has 
increased over the last decade, take-up remains low (Cole et al., 2013; Eling, Pradhan, & 
Schmit, 2014). Many factors contribute to low take-up rates, including lack of trust in the 
insurance provider (H. Cai, Chen, Fang, & Zhou, 2015; Cole, 2015) and lack of 
familiarity with the concept of insurance or the specific product (Cole et al., 2013; Eling 
et al., 2014). 
One approach to increasing take-up is to distribute microinsurance through MFIs, often 
by bundling insurance products with loans. The bundling can either be mandatory, 
meaning clients must accept either all products in the bundle or none of them, or 
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voluntary, when clients can choose which specific product(s) in a menu of available 
options they wish to take-up. Bundling insurance with loans presents several advantages. 
It builds upon an MFI’s existing branch network and their relationship with the target 
population, allowing for higher outreach at lower distribution costs, and taking advantage 
of the trust that many clients have in their microfinance lender. It also helps MFIs 
manage their own risk by decreasing the likelihood that a client will default as a result of 
a dramatic event such as illness, death, accident, or crop loss (Ananth, 2005). 
Mandatory bundling of microfinance products, however, also has important drawbacks. 
Requiring clients to purchase insurance bundled with loans has been shown to decrease 
loan take-up, reducing overall access to financial services (Banerjee, Duflo, & Hornbeck, 
2014; Giné & Yang, 2009). Bundling may also affect clients’ ability to process and retain 
information about insurance, a new and complex financial product, at a time when they 
are preoccupied with their loan application. Living in poverty has been shown to reduce 
individuals’ ability to process and retain information, which Mullainathan and Shafir 
(2013) have labeled the “scarcity mindset,” increasing the likelihood that individuals 
experience “information overload” (Eppler & Mengis, 2004) when faced with arduous 
decisions, such as judging the value of a bundle of complex financial products.
The existing literature, however, has only considered the effect of mandatory bundling of 
loans and insurance product(s). It does not address how offering insurance bundled with 
loans on a voluntary basis affects client ability to evaluate an insurance product and 
willingness to accept it. In addition, the mechanisms by which bundling leads to higher or 
lower take-up have not been explicitly explored. This paper contributes to the literature 
by addressing these issues. It asks: is bundling voluntary insurance products with loans an 
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effective and responsible strategy to increase take-up of insurance? The potential effects 
of bundling a voluntary insurance product with loans are ambiguous. On one hand, taking 
advantage of the point of contact between a financial institution and an individual 
interested in signing up for financial products could provide a unique and cost-effective 
way to expand microinsurance take-up and help individuals protect themselves from risks 
with formal financial products. On the other hand, offering too many products 
simultaneously in a bundle could lead to cognitive overload, low understanding of 
insurance, and therefore low adoption.  
We test the effect of separating a bundled, voluntary microinsurance product with credit 
on insurance take-up, insurance coverage amount and understanding by randomly 
varying the time when a crop insurance product was offered to Colombian farmers 
applying for microcredit loans to support their agricultural activities. Additionally, we 
examine if those who have a greater understanding of the product are more likely to 
purchase. The insurance is designed to protect smallholder farmers against major natural 
disasters, such as flooding, drought, landslides, or frost. It is underwritten by a 
commercial insurer, subsidized by the government, and distributed through an MFI 
serving households in rural, mountainous areas of Colombia. Individuals applying for a 
loan from the institution between March and October 2015 were assigned to be offered 
crop insurance at the time of the loan application, in a voluntary bundled package (our 
control group), or several weeks later after their loan had been processed (our treatment 
group). We operationalized the treatment as a time-separated offer of the same insurance 
product to a statistically-similar sample of loan applicants (through the randomization), 
by the same sales agent (the loan officer), instead of opting for a completely independent 
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sales process in order to specifically capture the effect of bundling or separating the two 
offers, keeping all else equal as much as possible.  
We find that separating the offer of insurance did not improve any of the outcomes that 
we measured. The take-up rate was relatively high overall (22.8 percent) but was not 
statistically significantly different in the bundled and separated groups (24.5 percent and 
20.9 percent, respectively). Similarly, the amount of coverage purchased by individuals 
in the bundled group ($1,487) was higher than those in the separate group ($951), but 
again the result was not statistically significantly different.  
Finally, we do not find support for the hypothesis that bundling insurance with loans 
leads to cognitive overload and lower levels of understanding of the product. Overall, 
measures of understanding indicate that many clients in both the treatment and control 
groups do not recall important aspects of the insurance offer, the perils covered, or even 
whether or not they have insurance coverage. Surveyed individuals were incorrect 38 
percent of the time when asked if the insurance was required to obtain a loan, were wrong 
30 percent of the time when asked whether or not they had purchased the product, and 
were wrong 69 percent of the time regarding what perils the insurance product protects 
against. We find evidence that individuals who correctly answered survey questions 
regarding their insurance status and the perils covered by the product had higher take-up 
rates. However, we do not find this same association between knowing the product was 
voluntary and take-up rates.  
Individuals in the treatment (separated) group did not exhibit a better understanding of 
the insurance product than their counterparts in the bundled group, and clients reported 
perceiving clearly the voluntary nature of the crop insurance. On the contrary, our results 
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suggest that individuals in the separate sale group were more likely to answer questions 
about the product incorrectly than individuals in the bundled group (36 percent of the 
former did, versus 25 percent of the latter, but the difference is not statistically 
significant).  
Taken together, these results indicate that voluntary bundling of insurance products with 
loans is a valid approach to offering microinsurance. Low overall levels of understanding 
and recall of insurance product characteristics, however, highlight a critical need for 
strong consumer protection, whether bundled or separate sales approaches are used. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Microinsurance Demand and Bundling 
Farmers around the world face enormous and varied risks, and there is strong evidence 
that these risks have immense welfare effects and constrain the investment that 
individuals make in their farms, suggesting great potential value for agricultural 
insurance products (Hill, Magnoni, & Zimmerman, 2014). Initially when launched, MFIs 
attempted to improve the financial lives of poor households by offer lending services, but 
increasingly they are extending their outreach to beyond credit, by offering 
microinsurance (Khavul, 2010) as well as other products and services. However, demand 
for formal insurance products remains low (Cole et al., 2013; Eling et al., 2014; Giné, 
Townsend, & Vickery, 2008; Thornton et al., 2010). In a study piloting weather based 
index insurance in Ethiopia, on average about ten percent of potential clients purchased 
the product (Hill & Robles, 2010). Even where extensive subsidies and other costly 
efforts are made to increase demand, take-up typically remains low. Cole et al. (2013) 
studied take-up of a weather index insurance product in India, and found that even with 
high subsidies and customized educational and marketing interventions, take-up was 
around 28 percent. Households that were not exposed to these interventions designed to 
increase demand had take-up rates near zero.
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As mentioned previously, two barriers to microinsurance take-up are lack of trust in the 
provider and unfamiliarity with the product, or insurance in general. Cole et al. (2013) 
conclude that several determinants in addition to price, such as trust and familiarity, are 
important in determining whether or not a potential client will purchase. Giné et al. 
(2008) found that lack of product understanding was the most commonly given 
explanation by households in their decision not to purchase insurance. Both Cole (2015) 
and H. Cai et al. (2015) highlight the important role that trust plays in an individual’s 
decision about whether or not to purchase a microinsurance product.  
Two other main determinants that prior research has found to drive the demand for 
microinsurance are premium prices (Cole et al., 2013; Dercon, Gunning, Zeitlin, Cerrone, 
& Lombardin, 2012; Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, & Udry, 2012) and liquidity constraints 
(Cole et al., 2013). Karlan et al. (2012) find that price is a consistent driver of the demand 
for rainfall index insurance in northern Ghana, while Dercon et al. (2012) use a 
randomized field experiment in Kenya and determined that market demand was sensitive 
to discounts in price, but not to financial literacy, specifically risk literacy. Additionally, 
Cole et al. (2013) finds that both price and liquidity play an important role in the 
insurance purchase decision, using findings from a series of field experiments in rural 
India.  
One potential solution that has been put forth to increase take-up of microinsurance 
products is the process known as bundling. In bundling, multiple financial products are 
combined and offered at the same time to the same client, by the same institution. 
Bundling can be mandatory, in cases when clients must purchase the entirety of the 
bundled package to have access to the benefits of all the products and cannot opt out of 
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any singular piece of the bundle without losing access to all benefits, or voluntary, when 
clients and potential clients are offered multiple financial products at the same time but 
access to any component of the bundle is not contingent on the decision regarding the 
other product(s). Our study examines a situation of voluntary bundling, where individuals 
are offered, but not required to purchase, a crop microinsurance product when they apply 
for a loan from an MFI in Colombia.  
Although the premium price for both the treatment and control groups in our research are 
the same, the situation regarding paying for the insurance is different for the two groups. 
Individuals in the bundled (control) group can finance their premiums with their loan, and 
make payments on a monthly basis, whereas separate (treatment) group individuals must 
pay up front for the insurance. It is unknown what effect if any, this difference has on 
take-up rates and coverage amounts. 
 
2.2 Client Understanding 
While past research suggests mixed results of how understanding interacts with the 
decision to purchase microinsurance, it does little to inform us if individuals in the 
control or treatment group of our research design would be expected to have greater 
understanding of the product. We examine various efforts to increase understanding of 
microfinance products and also review the broader literature on decision making in the 
context of poverty to develop a hypothesis regarding the following question: which group 




Of particular relevance from the consumer perspective is client understanding of the 
products offered and how that understanding influences purchase decisions. Lack of 
sufficient understanding is sometimes cited by potential clients as a reason for not buying 
insurance (Giné & Yang, 2009; Takahashi, Ikegami, Sheahan, & Barrett, 2016). 
Additionally, Takahashi et al. (2016) find that learning kits including comics, skit tapes, 
and other tools contributed to better knowledge of livestock insurance, but this 
knowledge did not significantly increase take-up. Understanding of a product may also 
lead to higher renewal rates, as it helps to avoid disappointment with the product 
(Platteau & Ontiveros, 2013). However, some studies conclude that providing more 
information about microinsurance products does not directly increase take-up, even if it 
produces greater client knowledge of the product (Cole et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2013). 
Research has been conducted to determine if broader financial education, in contrast to 
information specific to the particular insurance product, can be effective in stimulating 
microinsurance demand. J. Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2011) find that participation in a 
financial education session increased take-up of a weather insurance product. Gaurav, 
Cole, and Tobacman (2011) find that a short insurance education module did not increase 
take-up, but a two-day educational program, involving games that simulate rainfall 
insurance, increased insurance demand by five percentage points. 
We turn to the literature about decision making in the context of poverty to ascertain 
whether individuals in the control or treatment group would be expected to have greater 
understanding of the product. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) discuss how scarcity of 
both time and money reduce an individual’s mental bandwidth and force them to focus on 
the present, leaving little space for long term planning and decision-making. While 
10 
 
bundling the microinsurance product with a loan application may have benefits for both 
MFIs and consumers in terms of cost of delivery and subsequently pricing, one 
consequence of the bundled scenario is that the primary concern of the individual during 
the loan application is the acquisition of financing. This means that the offer of crop 
insurance is secondary, or not present at all, in the minds of control group individuals, 
whereas in the separate sale group, individuals have already been approved, or denied, 
their loan. The cognitive strain associated with being presented too much information in 
the face of a decision is referred to as information overload (Eppler & Mengis, 2004). 
The effects of information overload include stress, loss of control over information and 
lower decision quality. These factors may lead some consumers to avoid making 
financial decisions. As such, due to the mental bandwidth required to complete the loan 
application, we would expect individuals in the control (bundled) group to remember less 
about the product, and as a result perform worse on the survey. This review of 
interventions designed to increase understanding and the broader review of decision-
making under poverty lend support to our original hypotheses, and support the following 
additional hypothesis:  
H1: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase overall client 
understanding of the product.  
One additional question which we wished to explore, unrelated to the analysis of the 
treatment, was regarding whether or not individuals who understood the product better 
were more likely to purchase the insurance product. Past studies have offered mixed 
results on whether or not an increased understanding of the product leads to higher take-
up rates (Cole et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016). However, as 
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mentioned previously, clients often list a lack of product understanding as a reason for 
not buying microinsurance (Giné & Yang, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2016). As such, we 
formulate and test the following hypothesis:  
H2: Individuals with a better understanding of the insurance product will be more 
likely to purchase the insurance product.  
 
2.3 Take-Up and Coverage Amounts 
Both mandatory and voluntary bundling offer MFIs a number of potential benefits. 
Bundling microcredit with insurance schemes can protect MFIs against client loan 
defaults (Banerjee et al., 2014; Mechler, Linnerooth-Bayer, & Peppiatt, 2006) or death 
(Kalra, 2010). Banerjee et al. (2014) also note that mandatory bundling of microfinance 
products can combat the problem of adverse selection among clients. Additionally, the 
strategy of bundling presents clear advantages in terms of reducing delivery costs and 
increasing outreach for the MFI. Wuebker, Baumgarten, Schmidt-Gallas, and Koderisch 
(2008) note that effective bundling can offer convenient, “one-stop-shop” options at a 
reduced cost to the client due to the savings in delivery. Offering multiple financial 
products to a fixed client base also provides multiple sources of revenue for institutions 
facing high operating costs given the low average loan sizes (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2009). This argument takes on additional weight in rural lending, where long 
distances and difficult road access to client farms add to the cost of delivering services.  
Evidence suggests that there can be negative consequences to making the insurance 
purchase mandatory as part of the bundling process (Banerjee et al., 2014; Giné & Yang, 
2009). Giné and Yang (2009) found that clients offered a loan bundled with a mandatory 
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rainfall insurance product accepted the terms of the credit offer by 13 percentage points 
less than those who were offered credit with no insurance attached. This is concerning in 
that requiring the insurance discouraged individuals from using microfinance altogether. 
Banerjee et al (2014) found that requiring the purchase of health insurance with a loan 
decreased both loan renewal rates for existing clients and take-up rates of loans for new 
clients in India. This switch to mandatory insurance was so unpopular among clients that 
this policy was eventually abandoned by the MFI.  
This prior research finds that potential clients react negatively to the mandatory bundling 
of microfinance products, and our prior literature review regarding the association 
between understanding the product and the decision to purchase insurance led us to 
formulate the hypothesis that separating the insurance will lead to better understanding 
and those who understand the product will be more likely to purchase the insurance 
product. As such, we determine that separating the loan offer from the insurance offer in 
a voluntary bundle will lead to an increase in client willingness to purchase the insurance 
product. As such we formulate the following two hypotheses regarding insurance take-up 
rates and coverage amounts:  
H3: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase take-up rates.  
H4: Offering the insurance separated from the loan will increase coverage 
amounts.  
Prior studies suggest that the mandatory bundling of microfinance products is beneficial 
to MFIs, but potential clients are not always receptive to accepting the terms of these 
packaged products. This study contributes to this growing literature by examining 
whether separating the insurance offer from the loan application process affects take-up, 
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amount of insurance purchased, and product understanding when the purchase of 
insurance is not necessary for obtaining the loan. By understanding the effect of the 
timing of the insurance offer in relation to the loan application we can gain insight into 




CHAPTER 3. INSURANCE PRODUCT AND STUDY DESIGN 
3.1 Background and Product Design 
The randomized field experiment was conducted in partnership with Crezcamos, an MFI 
based in Bucaramanga, Colombia. Crezcamos serves over 70,000 clients with individual 
small business and agricultural loans. Almost two thirds of their clients live in rural areas, 
many in remote mountainous locations. Most of the sample individuals’ loans (89 
percent) have terms of 12 to 24 months. In addition to loans, Crezcamos offers several 
insurance products. First, all Crezcamos borrowers are required to purchase a mandatory 
credit life policy, which pays a benefit to Crezcamos if the borrower dies before the loan 
is fully repaid. Second, Crezcamos also offers a number of voluntary insurance products 
to its clients, including life insurance, property insurance covering the home and/or 
business, and vehicle insurance. These products are offered as a bundle with the loan, and 
almost all clients purchase them. 
The research we conducted took place in the departments of Santander, North Santander, 
and Cesar, a geographically diverse and agriculturally productive region in Colombia, 
South America. The region has a variety of microclimates and weather patterns that place 
farmers at risk to reduced yields and/or damaged plants. The region is also characterized 
by a highly competitive credit market; the small towns in which Crezcamos branches are 
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located are typically home to ten or more lenders, with clients frequently borrowing from 
multiple lenders. We included clients from nine Crezcamos branch offices in the research 
sample. A wide range of crops are grown in the region, including both permanent crops 
such as coffee, cocoa and citrus, as well as transitory crops, such as potatoes, rice and 
corn. Permanent crops are crops that do not require replanting between harvests while 
transitory crops require replanting after each harvest.  
The crop insurance product examined in this study is underwritten by the insurer 
MAPRE. It was introduced by Crezcamos to clients in two of its branches in 2014, and in 
seven more branches as part of the study in 2015. The product is designed for smallholder 
farmers in Colombia, and is subsidized by the Colombian government. It covers losses 
from seven weather-related perils: drought, excessive rain, hail, frost, flooding, 
avalanches and landslides. The product is designed to offer coverage against natural 
disasters, not to cover all possible risks to the farmer. For example, it does not cover crop 
failures or losses due to pests or diseases. Additionally, it does not protect the farmer 
against any loss associated with a drop in the market price of their crop, or issues 
regarding storage or transportation of the crop after harvest. 
Many, but not all, of the popular crops in the region, such as coffee, cocoa, and citrus 
trees are eligible for coverage. However, other common crops grown in the region, such 
as tomatoes, carrots, and pineapples, cannot be protected by the product. Livestock also 
cannot be covered by this product. Both loan applicants of Crezcamos and non-
borrowers, including those denied a loan, are eligible for the product. Each policy covers 
only one crop; clients may purchase separate policies for multiple crops, although this 
rarely happens in practice.  
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Key elements of the insurance product differ for various crops, based on whether the crop 
is permanent or transitory. For permanent crops, the insurance covers the farmer’s plants 
for one calendar year from the time of purchase. The permanent crop coverage pays out 
only if the weather related event permanently damages the farmer’s plant, not necessarily 
if yields are low for a single harvest, but the plant will recover and produce the following 
year. By contrast, the insurance for transitory crops covers the crop yield, but only 
through the next harvest, not for the entire calendar year. As such, for producers of 
permanent crops the insurance provides a benefit for a longer period of time. Transitory 
crop farmers who purchase the insurance earlier in the growing cycle also enjoy the 
benefit of a longer period of coverage when compared to transitory crop farmers who 
purchase towards the end of the crop cycle.  
Total premiums are based on a rate of three to eight percent of the insured amount, 
depending on the crop. The government subsidizes 60 to 80 percent of that premium 
amount, depending on the crop, the farm size, and whether clients qualify as a “small 
farmer,” a qualification that nearly all Crezcamos clients achieve. In general, the rate is 
higher for individuals who choose to cover transitory crops as opposed to permanent 
crops. Clients can purchase a maximum amount of coverage per hectare depending on the 
crop covered. These maximums vary from a low of $350/hectare to a high of 
$6,667/hectare. On average, clients pay a rate of about $1 for every $100 of coverage 




3.2 Study Design 
To measure the causal effect of separating a bundled microfinance product, we offered a 
crop microinsurance product in both bundled and separated ways. Individuals applying 
for a loan from Crezcamos were randomly assigned to be offered the new crop 
microinsurance product either immediately following the loan application (control), or at 
a later date after the loan application had been finalized (treatment). Traditionally, 
Crezcamos had offered the crop microinsurance concurrently with the loan application, in 
a bundled way. The loan approval process includes a visit to each applicant’s farm, 
during which the loan officer completes extensive documentation, including a risk 
assessment, and offers additional insurance products to the applicant.  
By randomly assigning individuals drawn from the same pool of loan applicants to either 
the control or treatment groups, we ensure that those who experience the two different 
types of insurance offers are identical in expectation in terms of both socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. In addition, the logistics of the randomization, detailed 
below, enabled a de facto stratification by loan officer, since the randomization happened 
on each loan officer’s smartphone with a 50 percent chance of the client being assigned 
to either group. This design choice implies that our separation of credit and insurance is 
not as complete as it could be; in our setup, all products are offered by the same agent 
(the loan officer) of the same organization (Crezcamos). Our results therefore may not 
extend to a situation where an MFI and a separate insurance company each offer their 
own product to the same potential client base. Operationalizing the treatment as a time-
separation of the insurance offer from the loan offer but keeping both “in-house” allows 
us to eliminate the influences of other factors on the demand for microinsurance, such as 
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trust and salesmanship of the loan officer, and narrow our focus on the joining or 
separation of the two offers which is at the heart of the bundled approach. 
The random assignment of farmers to treatment (separate offer) or control (bundled offer) 
groups took place in the field with the use of a smartphone app. All loan officers are 
provided with a smartphone by Crezcamos for calling clients or their manager. The 
randomization app was loaded on the phone and used as part of the loan application 
process to determine whether to offer the crop insurance during that visit (bundled) or 
separately. In effect, the use of the phone app in the field stratified our randomization by 
loan officer, ensuring that all loan officers managed loan applicants assigned to both 
treatment and control groups. Individuals assigned to the control group were offered the 
crop insurance immediately after the loan application process (and after other insurance 
products had been offered). For individuals assigned to the treatment condition, the loan 
officers met with them again approximately three weeks following the decision to 
approve or deny the loan, and offered the insurance at that time.1 Table 3 reports the 
averages of client and loan characteristics. The profile of individuals assigned to the 
treatment and control groups are very similar, and none of the differences are statistically 
significant. In addition, an F test of the joint significance of all the variables listed in 
Table 3 in a regression where the treatment assignment is the dependent variable returns a 
value of 1.19 (p=0.292), showing that the randomization was successful. 
Our intervention included developing a standardized sales protocol and new sales tools, 
in collaboration with Crezcamos. The protocol included a precise script that loan officers 
                                                 
1 Individuals whose loan application was denied were offered the crop insurance product, although none of 
them decided to purchase it. 
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used to describe the product, an explanatory video and current client testimonial that they 
showed loan applicants on their company-provided smartphone, as well as prepared 
answers to common questions. The protocol served two purposes. First, the protocol and 
associated tools supported loan officers in selling a complex new product both effectively 
and responsibly. One particular point of emphasis was to ensure that the clients 
understood that purchase of the crop insurance product was entirely voluntary, and would 
not have any effect on whether or not they would be approved for the loan. Additionally, 
we also wanted to ensure that loan officers were not pressuring individuals into 
purchasing the insurance product. Only a small proportion, 3.8 percent, of surveyed 
individuals reported in a follow-up survey that they felt pressured to purchase the 
insurance. Second, standardization helped to ensure loan officers took a consistent 
approach to each sale, allowing us to isolate the effect of our intervention.
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CHAPTER 4. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Data Sources 
We relied on four sources of quantitative data. The first was data on the random 
assignment from the smartphone app. This included descriptive data, such as client name, 
loan officer name, client identification number, and whether the client was assigned to 
the treatment or the control group. The second was administrative data from Crezcamos 
on all loan applicants and loans disbursed during the study. This data includes 
demographic information, information about the client’s farm and other economic 
activities, loan amount and loan term. Third, we use records of which clients purchased 
the crop insurance product from the underwriting insurer. For those who purchased the 
insurance, this data also provides details of the amount of coverage purchased and 
premium paid. Finally, we conducted a short telephone survey of clients to measure their 
understanding and recall of the insurance product. We focus on measures of (i) whether 
the client understood that the insurance was voluntary, and wouldn’t affect loan approval 
(ii) whether the client reported purchasing the crop insurance product, (iii) whether the 
client knew the perils covered by the product, and (iv) whether the client felt pressured by 
the loan officer to purchase the insurance.
During our study period of March 10 to October 31 of 2015, the randomizing app was 
used 426 times. Of the 426 total uses of the randomizing app, 58 were dropped from the 
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analyses, for reasons detailed below, so that our analysis sample includes 368 loan 
applicants who were assigned to either the treatment or the control group. First, 16 clients 
were mistakenly visited twice; in all analyses we consider the earlier assignment, and the 
second app use was removed. Second, we removed 16 app uses that did not match with a 
loan application in the lender’s database; these individuals approached loan officers about 
a loan, and were processed in the app, but decided not to continue their loan application 
for various reasons. Lastly, we removed 26 app uses for individuals who did not cultivate 
an insurable crop and were not eligible for the insurance. For these clients, the app should 
not have been used by the loan officer.
 Of the 368 individuals in our analysis sample, 154 responded to the phone survey, for a 
response rate of 42 percent. About 40 percent of the individuals who did not answer the 
survey refused to participate, while we were unable to contact the remaining 60 percent 
after multiple attempts. Quality control calls, to which our short survey was very similar, 
are common in Colombia, which explains why some individuals refused to participate in 
the survey. Table 2 presents data on survey respondents and non-respondents. It shows 
that respondents were not significantly different from non-respondents in their 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Respondents were, however, more likely 
to have purchased insurance than non-respondents (28 percent of respondents purchased 
insurance, versus 19 percent of non-respondents). In addition, of those who purchased 
insurance, survey respondents bought larger amounts of coverage and as such had higher 
premiums than non-respondents. These differences inform our findings about the effect 
of the treatment on knowledge and understanding of the product, but we cannot control 
for them in our statistical analyses. 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1, Panel A, shows detailed descriptive statistics on clients in our sample. On 
average, individuals were 45 years old, were predominantly male (75 percent) and 
married (68 percent).2 Almost all individuals had some form of formal education, 
although rarely beyond the primary school level. The average number of economic 
activities, defined as the number of sources of income, including different crops, was 2.4; 
by drawing on various sources of income, households informally insure against risks to 
any one source. Of the 368 individuals who applied for a loan, 329 were approved (89 
percent). The average loan amount was US$1,268 and the average loan term was 20 
months.  
In regard to the insurance product, 84 individuals opted to purchase, for an overall take-
up rate of 23 percent. The average amount of coverage was US$1,257, with a large range 
(from US$167 to US$8,333). As mentioned before, the premium is subsidized at various 
rates depending on the crop. The average total premium before subsidy was US$44, 
ranging from US$5 to US$329 and the average total premium actually paid (after the 
subsidy) was US$14, ranging from US$2 to US$129. This results in an average rate of 
US$1 per US$100 of coverage.
                                                 
2 For our analysis, we considered individuals who stated they were “married” and individuals who stated 




CHAPTER 5. RESULTS 
5.1 Summary Statistics – Survey Measures 
In addition to the information on demographics, loan characteristics, and insurance 
purchase, we have telephone survey responses for 154 individuals. Details about survey 
responses are listed in detail in Table 4, Panel B. Of the 154 respondents, 43 individuals 
(28 percent) purchased insurance and 111 did not. 30 percent of individuals were 
incorrect about whether or not they purchased insurance. Mostly these individuals stated 
that they purchased insurance, when in fact they had not. This is troubling in that it 
indicates that people were misinformed about their insurance status, the question was 
poorly phrased, or survey participants were not providing reliable answers.
Of the survey respondents, 38 percent of individuals incorrectly reported that purchasing 
the insurance product was required in order to get a loan. Crezcamos, along with many 
other MFIs, mandates the purchase of credit-life insurance with loans, and this may have 
contributed to the misunderstanding. Interestingly, however only 3.8 percent of survey 
respondents stated that they felt pressure to purchase the crop insurance by the loan 
officer. A majority of individuals (69 percent) either did not know the perils the insurance 
product covered or incorrectly listed an event that they believed was covered by the 
insurance product. Overall, knowledge was worse than expected, indicating the need to 
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tailor products so they are easy to understand and maximize efforts to increase client 
product understanding.  
 
5.2 Bivariate Analyses 
Because of the successful random assignment of individuals to treatment and control 
groups, simple comparisons of means in the two groups reveal the causal effect of 
separating the crop insurance offer from the loan application on the outcomes of interest. 
We present such comparisons in Table 4, before turning to multivariate analyses in order 
to increase the precision of our estimates and test their robustness.  
Table 4 highlights three main findings. First, separating the offer of insurance from the 
loan application process did not lead to an increase in take-up of the insurance. On the 
contrary, the rate of insurance purchases was slightly higher in the bundled group (25 
percent) than in the separate group (21 percent), although the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Second, while take-up rates were statistically equivalent in the two groups, the data 
provide suggestive evidence that separating the offer of insurance led to a decrease in the 
amount of coverage purchased. Individuals in the separate group purchased a lower 
average amount of coverage (US$951) than individuals in the bundled group (US$1,487). 
This lower coverage amount also means that total premiums before the subsidy and the 
premium the clients actually pay (after subsidy) are lower for the treatment group.  
Third, and connected to the lack of effect on take-up, separating the insurance offer did 
not significantly increase measures of understanding of the insurance product. In the 
treatment group, 35 percent of individuals were incorrect about whether the insurance 
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was required, compared to 40 percent in the control group (not statistically significant). 
In regards to individuals incorrectly reporting whether or not they had purchased 
insurance, 36 percent of separate (treatment) group individuals were wrong about this 
question and only 25 percent were incorrect in the bundled (control) group, although 
these differences are not statistically significant. The majority of individuals in both 
groups were incorrect about the perils the product protected against, with 68 percent of 
the treatment group getting this question incorrect compared to 69 of the control group 
(not statistically significant). Finally, a small percentage of both groups reported that they 
felt pressured by the loan officer to purchase the insurance product, with 4.8 percent of 
the treatment group saying they felt pressure compared to 2.9 percent of the control group 
(not statistically significant).  
Overall, while the results do not point to clear, statistically significant differences in 
product understanding between the two groups, the available evidence provides some 
suggestion that separating the insurance offer led to lower understanding of the product, 
contrary to our first hypothesis. More individuals in the treatment group were incorrect 
about whether or not they actually purchased insurance. This finding that separating the 
insurance offer from the loan does not lead to improved understanding can help to 
alleviate the consumer protection concerns of practitioners and researchers who worry 
that the voluntary bundling of microfinance products may have negative consequences 




5.3 Multivariate Analysis of Take-Up 
Next, we ran a series of OLS regressions to determine if separating the insurance offer 
led to a higher rate of insurance purchase. We implement the following regression model 
to measure the intent-to-treat effect of our treatment on the take-up of insurance:  
    Y𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇i + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + δZi + 𝜀𝑖   (1) 
where i indexes the individual loan applicants, Y is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
individual purchased crop insurance and 0 otherwise, T is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the individual was assigned to the treatment group and 0 if they were assigned to the 
control group. X is a vector of controls including applicants’ number of economic 
activities, number of dependents, age, gender, marital status, education status, home 
ownership, loan amount, nature of the crop insured (permanent or transitory), and Z is a 
series of binary variables for each Crezcamos loan officer who participated in the study 
and for the month in which the app was used. We implement this model as linear 
probability models rather than as probits because some loan officers processed very few 
loan applications and did not sell any insurance policies. As such being assigned to one of 
these loan officers would perfectly predict not purchasing insurance and the 
corresponding observations would drop from the probit sample. We ran probit 
regressions to test the robustness of our findings, and results are qualitatively similar to 
the linear probability models (not shown). In all analyses, we cluster standard errors at 
the branch level. The coefficient of interest is β.  
In all of the regressions using the insurance purchase decision as the dependent variable, 
all of the coefficients of interest are negative, but not statistically significant. This 
provides evidence that separating the insurance offer from the loan application does not 
27 
 
improve take-up rates, failing to support our Hypothesis 3. In column (1), we include 
only the control variables for loan officer and app use month (Z) and then measure the 
intent-to-treat effect. This analysis shows that being assigned to receiving the insurance 
offer separately (treatment) from the loan application process was associated with a 7.4 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood to purchase the insurance, although the 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
In column (2) we include the additional control variables as specified in vector X in the 
model above. These results show a similar, but still insignificant, result. Columns (3) and 
(4) exclude individuals who do not cultivate a permanent crop, to see if there was a 
treatment effect for only these individuals. We see similar results for those who only have 
permanent crops, although again the treatment is not statistically significant.  
In columns (2) and (4) when using the variable regarding loan amount, we denote 
individuals who were denied a loan to have receive a loan amount of $US0.01, so that 
they are not excluded from the regression and we can still take the log of loan amount for 
the analysis. Without making this adjustment, we would lose individuals who were 
denied a loan from the analysis, both reducing our total number of observations for the 
regressions and causing us to not consider denied individuals in our analysis. It is worth 
noting that no one who was denied a loan by Crezcamos purchased the crop insurance 
product. Eliminating denied individuals from the analysis does not result in significant 
differences between the take-up rates of the two groups.  
In Table 6 we investigate the heterogeneity of our main result. We run our main 
regression on sub-samples of the data according to loan size, gender, and age of the 
borrower. For all sub-samples, take-up was lower in the treatment group than in the 
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control group, but not statistically significantly so in any sub-sample. Columns (1) and 
(2) separate individuals based on the size of their loan, using US$1,000, which is the 
median loan amount, as the cutoff point. Columns (3) and (4) run the analysis separately 
for men and women. Columns (5) and (6) separate individuals into young and old, based 
on the median age (44) of individuals.  
Our analysis of the insurance take-up rate found no significant effect of receiving the 
offer separately on probability of insurance purchase. It is worth noting that while not 
significant, the coefficients for the treatment were negative in all of the regressions. This 
finding provides evidence against Hypothesis 3 and suggests that separating the insurance 
sale from the loan application has no, or possibly a negative, effect on the decision to 
purchase insurance when compared to a voluntary, bundled offering.  
 
5.4 Extended Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Insurance Coverage  
By performing a series of analyses regarding how the treatment affects the coverage 
amount individuals elect to purchase, we find suggestive evidence that separating the 
insurance offer from the loan actually decreases the amount of coverage people buy, 
particularly for men, younger individuals, and individuals with large (greater than or 
equal to US$1,000) loans. This strengthens the preliminary analysis using two-sided t-
tests which showed some indication that individuals who purchased insurance in the 
bundled group bought higher amounts of coverage than the separate group, contradicting 
Hypothesis 4. One limitation to this analysis is that there were only 84 individuals who 
purchased insurance, and thus our sample size is much smaller than the previous analysis 
of take-up rates. As such, we first conduct a series of t-tests, divided into subgroups, to 
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examine the effect of the treatment on coverage amount. Detail from these tests can be 
found in Table 7.  
As mentioned previously, when examined overall, individuals in the treatment group 
purchase a lower amount of coverage on average (US$951) than those in the control 
group (US$1,487), a difference that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In 
all of the subgroups, individuals in the control group (bundled) purchased more coverage 
than individuals in the treatment (separated) group, although some subgroups exhibit 
more stark contrasts than others. Individuals with large loans purchased an average of 
US$1,685 of coverage if assigned to the control group and only US$1,010 if assigned to 
the treatment. Men in the control group purchased US$1,757 dollars of coverage 
compared to US$1,080 if in the treatment. Young individuals also purchased more 
coverage if they were in the control group, with coverages amounts on average being 
US$1,821 compared to US$946 if they were assigned to the treatment.  
Since the overall difference in coverage is significant at the 10 percent level, we analyze 
coverage within a regression framework. We use the same regression model described in 
equation 1 above, but now use the amount of coverage as the dependent variable (Yi). 
The results of the regression analysis suggest that being assigned to the treatment led to 
lower amounts of coverage, although the coefficient of interest is not significant at the 5 
percent level or below in any of the analyses. Since premiums are calculated based on 
coverage amounts, this analysis also shows us that individuals in the treatment group 
have lower premiums, both before and after the government subsidy. Detailed results of 
our multivariate analysis of coverage amount can be found in Table 8.  
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The coefficients on the treatment variable in columns (1) and (3) suggest that being 
offered insurance separately from the loan application process had a negative effect on 
the amount of coverage purchased by US$165 and US$246 for all crops and only 
permanent crops, respectively. These regressions control for loan officer and the month 
app was used (vector Z variables), but do not include the other control variables 
described in vector X; in column (1) the sample includes all loan applications, in column 
(3) the sample is restricted to applicants with a permanent crop. When the X vector 
control variables are included the coefficients on the treatment indicator remain negative, 
but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Columns (2) and (4) are for the full 
sample and applicants with permanent crops only, respectively.  
Based on the analysis of the coverage variable, there appears to be suggestive evidence 
that individuals who received the treatment had significantly lower amounts of coverage 
than individuals who did not. This contradicts Hypothesis 4, and lends evidence to 
support the fact that separating the insurance product from the loan may lead to decreases 
in coverage amounts.  
 
5.5 Multivariate Analysis of Product Understanding 
In terms of understanding of the product as measured by our survey, we expected the 
separation of the insurance offer and loan application to increase understanding by 
combatting the problem of information overload, and as a result of this, we hypothesized 
that take-up rates and coverage amounts would increase. However, in the face of the 
finding that the treatment did not improve take-up or coverage, we examine the survey 
data to determine if the treatment improved measures of understanding independent of 
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the take-up and coverage results, and find no support for our third hypothesis regarding 
product understanding alone. We measured how accurately clients answered survey 
questions to test understanding of the product across the two groups. Three of the four 
survey measures were insignificant, and there is evidence that client knowledge about 
whether or not they had purchased the insurance product was actually better in the 
bundled (control) offering.  
The previous multivariate analyses of both take-up rates and coverage amounts yielded 
no evidence that separating the insurance sale from the loan application led to any 
increase in take-up rates or coverage amounts. In regards to survey responses, we also 
examined individuals answers to see if those in the treatment (separate) group had greater 
knowledge of the product than those in the control (bundled) group. We focused on the 
same four main variables as were mentioned in the bivariate analysis section regarding 
survey answers for the analysis: (i) whether the client understood that the insurance was 
voluntary, and wouldn’t affect loan approval (ii) whether the client reported purchasing 
the crop insurance product, (iii) whether the client knew the perils covered by the 
product, and (iv) whether the client felt pressured by the loan officer to purchase the 
insurance. We used the same regression model as in the previous two analyses. The only 
difference from the previous analysis is that now Yi is now a binary measure of each of 
the four survey responses measured. For dependent variables (i) (ii) and (iii) specified 
above, incorrect responses to these questions coded as 1 and correct answers were 
recorded as 0. For dependent variable (iv), the response was coded as 1 if the individual 
felt pressure to buy the insurance, and 0 if they reported they did not feel pressure.  
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Detailed results of the multivariate analysis of the survey measures can be found in Table 
9. Again, all results shown are OLS regressions, because probit regressions drop certain 
observations for loan officers who only had a few uses of the app, and thus would 
perfectly predict the binary outcome variables. Columns (1) and (2) show a regression of 
the treatment on whether or not the individuals were incorrect about whether or not the 
insurance purchase was required in order to get a loan (which it was not). In Column (1), 
where there were control variables for both the loan officer and month the app was used 
(vector Z). The coefficient is negative, meaning that individuals in the treatment group 
were 9 percentage points less likely to state that the insurance was required, however, the 
results for this question were not statistically significant. Column (2) also has controls for 
the loan officer and month, but also includes the control variables in vector X. This 
regression also shows a negative, but not statistically significant, relationship between the 
treatment and respondents answers to whether or not the insurance purchase was 
required.  
Columns (3) and (4) use whether or not the individual was incorrect when they were 
asked the question “Did you purchase the crop insurance product”. Surprisingly, 30 
percent of survey respondents got this question wrong, and individuals in the treatment 
(separate) group were more likely to get this question incorrect by 19.5 and 28.4 
percentage points, respectively. The treatment coefficient in column (3) is significant at 
the 10 percent level, while the treatment is significant at the 1 percent level in column (4). 
This finding is contrary to our Hypothesis 1, and provides evidence that individuals in the 
bundled (control) group actually recall their ownership status of the insurance product 
better than individuals in the separate (treatment) group.  
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Columns (5) and (6) use individuals being incorrect about the perils the product covers as 
the dependent variable. The results from these analyses show that individuals in the 
treatment group are slightly less likely to be incorrect about the perils covered by the 
product, although these figures are not statistically significant. Columns (7) and (8) use 
the individuals feeling pressured to purchase the product from the loan officer as the 
dependent variable. While this is not directly a question about knowledge of the 
insurance product, it is important from a consumer protection standpoint. If an individual 
felt more pressure to purchase in one of the two scenarios, that would be a major 
consideration. Being assigned to the treatment group increased the likelihood individuals 
reported being pressured into buying the insurance by 5.5 and 6.9 percentage points, 
respectively, in columns (7) and (8). However, the effect of the treatment was not 
statistically significant.  
While the direction of the association is mixed for our four different measures of 
understanding and pressure to purchase in this analysis, there is no evidence to support 
the fact that separating the sale of the insurance product from the loan application 
increases understanding, contrary to our Hypothesis 1. There is also suggestive evidence 
that individuals assigned to the treatment group are worse at understanding whether or 
not they purchased the insurance product.  
In addition to our main focus on the effect of the treatment on take-up rates, coverage 
amounts, and levels of understanding, our Hypothesis 2 aimed to ascertain whether 
higher understanding of the product was associated with higher take-up rates. We found 
evidence that individuals who understand the perils covered by the product and 
individuals who knew whether or not they had bought the insurance product had higher 
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take-up rates than individuals who were incorrect on these two survey measures, but we 
found no association between understanding about the voluntary nature of the product 
and take-up rates.  
For this analysis, we compared survey respondents’ understanding of the product by 
analyzing answers to the following questions: (i) whether the client understood that the 
product was not required (i) whether the client reported purchasing the crop insurance 
product and (ii) whether the client knew the perils covered by the product. To conduct 
our analysis, we implement the following regression model:  
    Y𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽Si + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + δZi + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
where i indexes the individual loan applicants, Y is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
individual purchased crop insurance and 0 otherwise, S is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the individual was correct for the survey question being analyzed and 0 if they were not. 
X and Z are the same vector of variables as described in the previous regression analyses. 
A detailed breakdown of this analysis can be found in Table 10.  
Looking first at the regression analyzing whether or not clients understood that the 
product was not required, we see that individuals who incorrectly answered this question 
were not statistically more or less likely to purchase the product. However, in examining 
the next column we see that individuals who were correct about their insurance purchase 
status had significantly higher take-up rates than individuals who were incorrect (an 
increase of 32 percentage points). This is due to the fact that most individuals who 
answered this survey question incorrectly stated that they purchased insurance, when they 
in fact had not purchased insurance and very few individuals who purchased the product 
incorrectly stated they had not purchased. Of surveyed individuals who did not buy the 
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insurance product, 40 percent incorrectly stated that they had purchased insurance, while 
only 5 percent of individuals who purchased the product incorrectly stated they had not 
purchased.  
Another measure we examined was individuals recall of whether or not understanding the 
perils covered by the product increased the likelihood of purchase. As we can see, 
individuals who understood which perils were covered by the product correctly had take-
up rates 24.5 percentage points higher than those who got the survey question wrong, and 
this result is statistically significant.  
Of the three survey variables we analyzed to determine if understanding was associated 
with an increased likelihood of insurance purchase, two returned positive, significant 
results. This provides evidence that individuals who understand certain features of the 




CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We investigate the effect of separating a voluntary bundle of credit and insurance on the 
demand for and understanding of insurance products. Applicants for agricultural 
microcredit loans in Colombia were randomly assigned to be offered voluntary crop 
microinsurance either together with their loan application, or a later date. While bundling 
can help MFIs and insurers expand outreach and lower costs and prices, it may also 
confuse borrowers who are focused on their loan application, and lead to lower take-up. 
Our results show that bundling financial products for low-income individuals in 
developing countries, in a voluntary manner, is a valid strategy for increasing financial 
access at the lowest cost. Individuals offered a loan and a crop microinsurance product in 
a bundled manner did not exhibit lower levels of understanding of the product, and were 
not less likely to choose to purchase the insurance. On the contrary, we found suggestive 
evidence that bundling led to better understanding of the insurance and higher coverage 
purchased. Additionally, in our analysis of how understanding of the survey affected 
take-up rates, we found some evidence that those who understood the product better were 
more likely to purchase insurance. 
Our work suffers from two main limitations. First, we do not consider the actuarial value 
and relevance of the product to participants, either real or perceived. The research design 
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is internally valid regardless of product characteristics, but such characteristics do 
influence potential clients’ decision to purchase as well as the broad understanding of the 
research results. The cost of the insurance (the average rate actually paid was $1 for every 
$100 of coverage) suggests that the insurance would be actuarially fair for clients 
exposed to losses with a probability of happening during the policy period equal to or 
greater than 1 percent. While we are aware of no research that provides probabilities of 
small-scale farmers in mountainous Colombia experiencing losses from one or more of 
the event(s) covered by this product, Colombia was ranked as one of the 20 countries 
most vulnerable to extreme weather risks as a result of climate change (Wheeler, 2011). 
In addition, Dietrich and Ibanez (2015) found that more than 80 percent of tobacco 
farmers in the same department of Colombia where this research was conducted, 
Santander, reported a shock in 2009-2010, which were mainly weather related in nature. 
Beyond the question of actuarial fairness, we do not know whether the product actually 
helps its customers manage (and ideally reduce) the risks that they face. Further research 
on the portfolio of risk management tools that small holder farmers use could provide 
such evidence.  
Second, separating the offer of crop insurance from the loan application process has two 
implications for the potential client. The client receives the insurance offer at a separate 
time from the loan application and additionally, the client is not able to finance their 
insurance premiums with their loan payments, and individuals in the bundled group were. 
This means that individuals in the separate sale group must pay for the insurance upfront, 
while individuals in the bundled group can pay for their insurance in increments as they 
make their loan payments. Our experiment does not measure both of these differences 
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individually. However, since our treatment was designed to measure the effect of 
separating the insurance offer from the voluntary bundle, it is appropriate that we did not 
isolate these effects individually, as both the timing of the offer and financing differences 
are aspects of the bundling process. Future research could aim to test individually how 
changing the timing or altering the ability of clients to finance their premiums affects 
microinsurance take-up.  
Despite these limitations, our work highlights the need for strong consumer protection 
measures in microinsurance. Understanding of the insurance product was low in both 
bundled and separate offer groups, suggesting that information and consumer protection 
around the offer of insurance products is key. Failing to understand basic elements of the 
product will prevent clients from utilizing the insurance effectively and may cause 
disappointment. When clients do not know they have coverage, they may fail to make a 
claim in the event of a loss unless reminded. If they do not understand the policy terms or 
have unrealistic expectations of the payout, they may experience an unintentional lapse in 
coverage or have misconceptions about how they will manage their finances in the event 
of a loss. Our finding that individuals had low overall knowledge of the product 
highlights the necessity for MFIs and other providers of microinsurance to improve 
efforts to make products understandable and ensure ongoing access to information to 




Table 1 – Descriptive and Summary Statistics 
  N Mean  Median Standard dev. 
Panel A – Client characteristics 
1 if assigned to separate sale (treatment) 368 46.7 0 0.5 
# of economic activities 368 2.4 2 1.044 
# of children 359 2.9 3 2.166 
# of economic dependents 359 1.1 1 1.393 
Age 359 45 44 13 
% female 368 25.3 0 0.435 
% married 359 67.7 1 0.468 
% with any formal education 358 92.7 1 0.26 
% own home 368 69.8 1 0.46 
     
Panel B – Loan and insurance characteristics 
Purchased insurance  368 22.8 0 0.42 
Loan term (months) 368 20.1 24 6.9 
Loan amount (USD) 325 1,267 1,000 904 
Insurance coverage purchased (USD) 84 1,257 666 1412 
Total premium (USD, before subsidy) 84 43.65 19.95 58.56 
Premium actually paid (USD) 84 13.51 7.48 19.2 
Insurance rate (per $100 of coverage) 84 1.01 0.75 0.579 
Percent of max coverage 83 25.1 16.7 25.6 
Note. The sample includes 368 individuals offered insurance, 84 of whom chose to purchase. 
Percent of max coverage is calculated by dividing the maximum amount of coverage the client was 
eligible to purchase by the amount of coverage they actually purchased. The insurance rate is the 





Table 2 – Differences in Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Individuals 
 N All Not Surveyed Surveyed P-Value 
% assigned to the treatment group 368 46.7 48.1 44.8 0.529 
# of Economic Activities 368 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.736 
# of children 359 2.9 2.8 3.0 0.609 
# of dependents  359 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.984 
Age 359 45 44 46 0.101 
% female 368 25.3 25.2 25.3 0.984 
% married  359 67.7 67.1 68.5 0.794 
% any formal education 358 92.7 92.3 93.3 0.735 
% homeowners 368 69.8 68.7 71.4 0.574 
Loan term (months) 368 20.1 19.7 20.6 0.185 
Loan amount (USD) 325 1,268 1,227 1,320 0.358 
Coverage (USD) 84 1,257 933 1,567 0.039 
Total premium (USD) 84 43.7 30.5 56.2 0.044 
Premium paid (USD) 84 13.5 9.4 17.4 0.056 
Insurance rate (per $100 of coverage) 84 1.01 0.96 1.07 0.385 
Percent of max coverage  83 25.1 20.8 29.1 0.140 





Table 3 – Randomization Check – Bundled Vs. Separate Characteristics 
 N Total Bundled Separate P-Value 
# of economic activities 368 2.4 2.4 2.3 0.422 
# of children 359 2.9 2.8 3.0 0.643 
# economic dependents 359 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.114 
Age 359 44.6 43.9 45.4 0.275 
% female 368 25.3 28.6 21.5 0.121 
% married 359 67.7 68.8 66.5 0.641 
% any formal education 358 92.7 94.1 91.2 0.280 
1 if own home 368 69.8 68.9 70.9 0.670 
Loan amount (USD) 325 1,268 1,314 1,217 0.335 
Loan term (months) 368 20.1 20.4 19.7 0.364 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on take-up rates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All Crops All Crops Perm Crops Perm Crops 
          
treat -0.074 -0.076 -0.078 -0.081 
  (0.088) (0.093) (0.094) (0.096) 
1 if permanent crop   0.057     
    (0.071)     
# of economic activities   0.004   0.016 
    (0.011)   (0.016) 
# of dependents   -0.020*   -0.014 
    (0.010)   (0.012) 
age   -0.000   0.000 
    (0.001)   (0.001) 
1 if female    0.073   0.085 
    (0.056)   (0.059) 
1 if married    0.032   0.005 
    (0.061)   (0.060) 
1 if any formal ed.    0.043   0.068 
    (0.058)   (0.054) 
1 if own home    -0.005   0.001 
    (0.036)   (0.042) 
Ln(loan amount)    0.035*   0.035* 
    (0.015)   (0.017) 
Constant 0.126 0.008 0.222 -0.024 
  (0.203) (0.124) (0.166) (0.225) 
          
Observations 368 356 317 306 
R-squared 0.389 0.424 0.383 0.416 
Note. Standard errors clustered at the branch level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Includes control variables for loan officers and month of app use. All regressions are 
OLS. Column (1) is an regression of insurance purchase on the treatment including controls 
for each loan officer and the month in which the app was used. Column (2) is similar to (1) but 
with additional control variables. Columns (3) and (4) are the same as (1) and (2), except that 
Columns (1) and (2) use all of the crops for analysis while regressions (3) and (4) use only 
permanent crops.  
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Table 6 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on take-up rates, subgroups 





Loan Men  Women Young Old 
              
treat -0.043 -0.104 -0.064 -0.010 -0.089 -0.101 
  (0.082) (0.081) (0.065) (0.153) (0.078) (0.121) 
              
Observations 163 201 275 93 186 173 
R-squared 0.437 0.467 0.372 0.589 0.462 0.432 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes control variables for loan officer and month of app use. All of 




Table 7 – Coverage Amounts separated by treatment, with subgroups 
  N All Control Treatment P-Value 
Overall 84 1,257 1,487 951 0.085 
       
Small  31 1,048 1,184 833 0.429 
Large  53 1,380 1,685 1,010 0.111 
       
Men  56 1,443 1,757 1,080 0.102 
Women  28 887 1,037 617 0.313 
       
Young  46 1,498 1,821 946 0.109 
Old  38 967 977 956 0.925 
Note. Data in the all, control, and treatment group columns are 
averages, for the entire sample of insurance buyers (first line) and for 





Table 8 – Effect of separating the offer of insurance on coverage amount 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All Crops All Crops Perm Crops Perm Crops 
          
treat -165.278 -168.956 -245.971 -174.244* 
  (264.060) (94.970) (290.553) (78.797) 
1 if permanent crop   1,726.561***     
    (125.843)     
# of economic activities   -181.398*   -172.082* 
    (79.256)   (80.021) 
# of dependents    -323.449***   -325.566*** 
    (37.041)   (37.974) 
age   -4.765   -2.827 
    (4.097)   (3.693) 
1 if female    -140.082*   -135.119 
    (71.348)   (79.569) 
1 if married    143.773   159.379 
    (315.967)   (313.655) 
1 if any formal ed.    -69.971   -64.851 
    (273.790)   (328.911) 
1 if own home    195.445   176.762 
    (119.061)   (121.787) 
Ln(loan amount)    575.978**   549.774* 
    (224.872)   (235.499) 
Constant 879.179 2,010.993** 5,158.382*** 429.229 
  (501.839) (663.837) (279.046) (389.794) 
          
Observations 84 84 80 80 
R-squared 0.640 0.741 0.651 0.734 
 Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Includes control variables for loan officers and month of app use. All of the above regressions are OLS. 
Columns (1) and (2) include all crops, with additional control variables as listed in column (2). Columns 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10 – Insurance Take-Up by Correct Survey Answers  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Required Bought Perils 
Correct about        
 Insurance Required -0.020     
  (0.073)     
 Insurance Purchased    0.323***   
    (0.067)   
 Perils Covered      0.245*** 
      (0.058) 
1 if permanent crop 0.113 0.122 0.165 
  (0.116) (0.107) (0.103) 
# of economic activities 0.007 -0.019 -0.001 
  (0.064) (0.058) (0.053) 
# of dependents  -0.013 -0.018 0.002 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) 
age 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
1 if female  0.218 0.235 0.196 
  (0.177) (0.134) (0.162) 
1 if married  0.004 0.010 -0.004 
  (0.109) (0.102) (0.101) 
1 if any formal ed  0.132** 0.045 0.178 
  (0.057) (0.079) (0.112) 
1 if own home  0.008 0.013 -0.005 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.037) 
Ln(loan amount) 0.057* 0.053*** 0.069* 
  (0.027) (0.013) (0.031) 
Constant -0.725** -0.904*** -1.007*** 
  (0.259) (0.261) (0.249) 
        
Observations 147 149 149 
R-squared 0.511 0.572 0.554 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the branch level, in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is insurance 
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